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Abstract. Adversarial training is the most successful empirical method
for increasing the robustness of neural networks against adversarial at-
tacks. However, the most effective approaches, like training with Pro-
jected Gradient Descent (PGD) are accompanied by high computational
complexity. In this paper, we present two ideas that, in combination,
enable adversarial training with the computationally less expensive Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). First, we add uniform noise to the ini-
tial data point of the FGSM attack, which creates a wider variety of
adversaries, thus prohibiting overfitting to one particular perturbation
bound. Further, we add a learnable regularization step prior to the neu-
ral network, which we call Pixelwise Noise Injection Layer (PNIL). Inputs
propagated trough the PNIL are resampled from a learned Gaussian dis-
tribution. The regularization induced by the PNIL prevents the model
form learning to obfuscate its gradients, a factor that hindered prior
approaches from successfully applying one-step methods for adversarial
training. We show that noise injection in conjunction with FGSM-based
adversarial training achieves comparable results to adversarial training
with PGD while being considerably faster. Moreover, we outperform
PGD-based adversarial training by combining noise injection and PNIL.
Keywords: Deep Learning · Adversarial Training · Noise
1 Introduction
Deep learning has led to breakthroughs in various fields, such as computer vi-
sion [12], language processing [22], and reinforcement learning [20]. However,
the deployment of deep learning models in real-world applications is currently
limited by their vulnerability to small adversarial perturbations to their input
(adversarial examples [29]). These perturbations are produced by special opti-
mization methods, often referred to as adversarial attacks. The magnitude of the
perturbations is bounded by a value  for a given norm (e.g., l∞, l2) [6]. This
guarantees that a human would still perceive the perturbed input as belonging
to the original class.
Making neural networks robust to adversarial examples is still an unsolved
problem. In a constant challenge between new adversarial attacks and defenses,
most of the proposed defenses have shown to be ineffective [34,31]. One partic-
ularly successful approach to increase the adversarial robustness of a model is
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Fig. 1. Example of an input image X from the MNIST data set, the biases B and
weights W learned by our proposed method (PNIL), and the resulting variance Σ
calculated for X. The output image Y is obtained by drawing pixel values from a
Gaussian distribution according to Equation 3.
adversarial training [6]. This method augments the training data with adversarial
examples until the model learns to classify them correctly. Here, the robustness
of the model against adversarial attacks is strongly dependent on the adversarial
examples used to train the model. In the past, mainly computationally expensive
multi-step adversarial attacks such as Projected Gradient Descent (PGD), have
proven effective for adversarial training [17]. Less expensive one-step attacks,
such as the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), have shown to be insufficient
on their own [13] as they provide no adversarial robustness against stronger
attacks.
In this paper, we propose a method consisting of two successive steps, that
together enable fast and stable adversarial training based on the FGSM attack.
First, we aim to find stronger perturbations with the FGSM attack by adding
noise in the range of the adversarial perturbation to the initial data point. Since
the perturbation budget of the adversarial attack is limited around the noisy
data point rather than the original data point, a wider variety of adversaries
can be generated. In turn, the network is less likely to overfit to the particular
perturbation bound. Secondly, we improve the adversarial robustness of a neural
network by including a learnable data augmentation process we call Pixelwise
Noise Injection Layer (PNIL). The PNIL resamples the input features of a neural
network from a multivariate Gaussian distribution before passing them to the
next layer. The mean of this distribution is given by the input features, and the
variance is calculated by the PNIL. The resampling process weakens the adver-
sarial perturbation, which improves the robustness of the model and increases
the stability of FGSM-based training. Furthermore, our experiments show that
the additional regularization induced by the noise prevents the network from
learning to obfuscate its gradients during FGSM-based training. The PNIL is
illustrated in Figure 1. We utilize the reparameterization trick, known from the
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Variational Autoencoder [10], to update the parameters of the PNIL through
backpropagation along with the other parameters of the neural network.
The contributions of this paper are the following:
– We show that former claims that FGSM-based training can lead to robust
neural networks are misleading [32]. Our experiments demonstrate that net-
works trained with the FGSM-based attacks often learn to disguise their
gradients, resulting in strong robustness against gradient-based attacks, but
no robustness against gradient-free attacks.
– We propose a solution to this problem in the form of learnable data aug-
mentation called Pixelwise Noise Injection Layer (PNIL), which prevents
gradient obfuscation of FGSM-based training and increases the adversarial
robustness of neural networks.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we discuss earlier work in this research area and briefly describe
common threat models in the adversarial setting.
2.1 Related Work
With the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [6], an efficient way to construct
adversarial examples with one gradient step was proposed, and used for the first
form of adversarial training. In subsequent work, variants of the FGSM have been
developed, which find stronger adversaries by making multiple smaller gradient
descent steps [14,17]. Networks trained with FGSM adversarial training proved
to be vulnerable to those attacks, which made FGSM-based training insufficient,
whereas the multi-step Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) method [17] showed
to be an effective way of training robust neural networks against multi-step
attacks. However, the computational complexity of PGD training is considerably
larger, depending on the number of steps used to find the optimal perturbation.
To circumvent the increased computational complexity of PGD training, re-
cent work tried to make FGSM-based adversarial training feasible. The authors
of [13] showed that curvature artifacts around the original data point can mask
the true gradient direction, which prevents the FGSM attack from finding a
useful perturbation. Their modification of the FGSM called R+FGSM partially
solved this problem by first taking a small random step with size α <  before
performing the actual attack. Yet, their method only provided little robustness
against multi-step attacks.
This idea was improved by [32], where the authors chose a random starting
point within the full perturbation budget. This enabled adversarial training with
FGSM to achieve competitive adversarial robustness compared to PGD-based
training. Nevertheless, this approach only works with specific step sizes of the
FGSM attack and is sensitive to the network architecture. Further, it can lead
to a sudden drop in model robustness and therefore requires an early stopping
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routine that monitors the accuracy against PGD attacks [32]. In our experiment,
we also observed that this approach often leads to models learning to obfuscate
their gradients during training, which results in no adversarial robustness against
gradient-free attacks. We will call this method RFGSM in the following.
Another approach to accelerate adversarial training is to update the pa-
rameters of the model and the adversarial perturbation simultaneously in every
backward pass [26]. This combines the gradual adjustment of the perturbation
and frequent updates of the model parameters. However, it has been shown that
this approach does not work well with training optimization methods (e.g., cycli-
cal learning rate [27], mixed precision training [19]) and is overall slower than
the RFGSM approach [32].
In addition to adversarial training, a variety of other defense measures have
been proposed. An important branch of these methods uses random perturba-
tions to weaken the effect of adversarial attacks [1,8]. Most of them are based
on noise injection, where noise from an isotropic Gaussian distribution is added
to each feature in a layer. The parameters of the distribution were either tune-
able hyperparameters [16,1] or learned through backpropagation [8]. Intuitively,
the presence of noise at inference time makes it more complicated to design
an adversarial example, as the attacker does not know the specific noise when
generating the adversarial perturbation. This intuition is supported by theoret-
ical work [18,24]. It was shown that injecting noise during the training phase of
a neural network reduces the sensitivity of the network to small input pertur-
bations [18]. Furthermore, later work [24] showed that noise injection from an
exponential family gives a lower bound on the adversarial robustness of neural
networks, dependent on the magnitude of the noise.
2.2 Adversarial Attacks
Constructing an adversarial perturbation r can be described by the following
optimization problem:
max
‖r‖p≤
L(Fθ(X + r), Y ) (1)
where X and Y are pairs of samples in a classification task, L is a suitable
loss function (e.g., categorical cross-entropy), and Fθ is a neural network param-
eterized by θ. The manner in which the perturbation r is found depends on the
specific type of adversarial attack, where attacks can be characterized by the
following attributes:
Norm-based: The magnitude of the adversarial perturbation is usually bounded
for a given norm (L∞, L1, L2) in such a way that any perturbed input would
still be perceived as belonging to its original class by humans.
Targeted/Untargeted: Adversarial attacks are additionally grouped by their
goal: They can either aim at causing any kind of misclassification (untargeted)
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or at causing the model to predict a particular target class (targeted).
Gradient-Based/Gradient-Free: Gradient-based attacks utilize the gradient
information of the model to find the optimal perturbation (FGSM [6], PGD
[17]). These attacks are not effective if the gradient information of the model
is obscured (e.g, through a non-differentiable layer in the network). In those
cases, a gradient-free method (Simultaneous Perturbation Stochastic Approxi-
mation (SPSA) [28]) can evaluate the actual robustness of the model.
White-box/Black-box: The attack either utilizes the gradient information
off the model itself to create the perturbation (white-box) or utilizes a similar
model to find a perturbation which is then transferred to the original model
(black-box). Black-box attacks can be used if the model is expected to hide its
gradients but are generally weaker than white-box attacks.
Randomized Models: Expectation Over Transformation (EOT) [2] is a proven
technique for calculating gradients of models with randomized elements. It can
be used to calculate gradients with respect to the expectation of the randomized
component.
Best practices for evaluating the adversarial robustness of models have been es-
tablished by prior work [3]. One important practice is to evaluate whether models
are obfuscating the gradients. If a model obfuscates its gradient, the typically
applied gradient-based attacks fail. These models are however, still vulnerable
to gradient-free attacks. Thus, it is important to evaluate with both gradient-
free and gradient-based attacks, to get a robustness estimate for the highest risk
[31]. Even though black-box attacks can be used to test models against gradi-
ent obfuscation, gradient-free attacks are recommended, as the transferability of
black-box attacks can not be guaranteed. We will follow these practices in this
paper and describe the exact threat model in Section 4.1.
3 Proposed Method
In this section, we describe our proposed method that enables fast and stable
adversarial training based on the FGSM attack.
3.1 Noise Augmented Adversarial Training
Current research shows that adversarial robustness against strong PGD attacks
can be achieved through RFGSM-based training with only small adjustments to
the initial FGSM formulation [32]. We argue that the limitation of the FGSM
attacks comes from the limited amount of perturbations the attack can generate.
By only using the sign of the gradient, the perturbations of the standard FGSM
formulation are limited to the corners of the n-dimensional hypercube defined by
the perturbation limit. The R+FGSM approach presented by [13] increases the
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amount of possible perturbations but still constricts perturbations to lie near the
corners of the hypercube. Finally, the FGSM variant presented by [32] increases
the amount of possible perturbations by a considerable amount. We follow the
idea of increasing the variety of possible perturbations and present a similar
approach, wherein we augment the training data with uniform noise before ap-
plying the FGSM attack. We call this approach Noise Augmented Fast Gradient
Sign Method (NFGSM) and give its details in Algorithm 1. In comparison to
the RFGSM method, NFGSM can create a wider variety of adversaries. This
is achieved by moving the hypercube away from the data point. Thereby, the
whole volume of the hypercube is used to create adversarial examples. In turn,
the network is less likely to overfit to the particular perturbation bound used to
train the model, which has been observed for prior models [30]. The difference
between vanilla FGSM, R+FGSM, RFGSM, and our method is summarized in
Figure 2. Keep in mind that NFGSM is only used for training as it produces
perturbations that are outside the perturbation bound of the FGSM attack and
thus could change the true label of the class for the human perception.
Algorithm 1: NFGSM-based adversarial training with perturbation
bound , perturbation r, number of Monte Carlo simulations L number
of epochs E, and batches B. An EOT based attack is given by L > 1.
for e in [1, E] do
for (Xb, Yb) in B do
noise = Uniform(-, );
Xbn = Xb + noise;
r =  · sign(∑Ll=1∇XbnL(Fθ(Xbn), Yb));
gradient = ∇θL(Fθ(Xbn + r), Yb);
// Update model weights θ with the given optimizer and
// calculated gradient
end
end
3.2 Pixelwise Augmentation Layer
To prevent the network from learning to obfuscate its gradients during the
FGSM-based training, we introduce a learnable data augmentation process we
call Pixelwise Noise Injection Layer (PNIL) that can be included in any neural
network. Let us consider Xi ∈ Rn as the ith sample of the data set X described
by its features (xi,1, xi,j , ...xi,J). The PNIL learns weights W = (w1, wj , ...wJ)
and biases B = (b1, bj , ...bJ) for every input feature and uses them to calculate
the variance Σi for the respective input according to Equation 2. The output of
the PNIL X ′i is computed by sampling noise for each feature xi,j from a standard
Gaussian distribution N (0, 1) which is weighted with the calculated variance Σi.
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(a) FGSM (b) R+FGSM (c) RFGSM (d) NFGSM
Fig. 2. Simplified illustration of the difference between FGSM, R+FGSM, RFGSM,
and the proposed NFGSM. The potential starting point of the attack (blue dot) is
given by the light blue region. An arbitrary gradient direction for each FGSM attack is
shown by a dotted arrow and the possible adversarial perturbations by a red dot at the
adversarial perturbation limit (solid black line). For the RFGSM attack the step size
(1.2 · ) is additionally shown by a dashed black line. The NFGSM attack enables more
possible perturbations, by utilizing the full area given by the maximum perturbation
rather than only a part of the area.
The reparameterization trick enables the network to update the weights and bi-
ases of the PNIL by backpropagation [10]. The forward pass outlined above is
given by Equation 3 and illustrated in Figure 1.
Σi = Xi ·W +B (2)
X ′i = Xi +N (0, 1) · exp
Σi
2
(3)
Networks trained with one step attacks learn to obfuscate their gradients
by converging to a global minimum where small curvature artifacts around the
minimum prohibit a one-step attack from finding a strong perturbation [13].
Thereby, the networks fail to learn to defend against strong adversarial attacks
but instead learn to weaken the FGSM attack. By injecting noise to the individ-
ual input features, the PNIL destroys the specific structure that the FGSM-based
attack generates and thus prohibits gradient obfuscation. This leads to strong
robustness against gradient-free and multi-step attacks, as we show in this paper.
Contrary to other approaches [1,16,8], we learn a variance for every feature
of the input with the PNIL, instead of applying identical Gaussian noise to the
features. Depending on the data set, this can lead to different values for B and
W . For simple data sets such as MNIST [15], the PNIL learns low biases B for
the central region of the images, as the objects of interest are located there (see
figure 1). For more complicated data sets like CIFAR10 [11], this approach does
not work, since the objects of interest are not always centered in the image. In
this case, the PNIL learns uniform biases B and focuses only on the intensity of
the pixels in each color channel using the weights W as exemplified by Figure 3.
Note that prior work showed that architectures that apply a random trans-
formation to the input during inference time should be evaluated with regard to
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the expectation of their output with the EOT method [2]. We will follow this
approach in our evaluation.
4 Experiments
(a) input (b) ΣR (c) ΣG (d) ΣB (e) output
Fig. 3. Example of an input image from the CIFAR10 data set, the respective variance
Σ learned by the PNIL for all color channels, and the output image after forwarding
the input trough the PNIL. The background of the image gets lost to noise, while only
the object of interest is still visible.
4.1 Evaluation
The objective of the experiments is to evaluate if noisy FGSM-based training
leads to robust neural networks and if the PNIL further improves this robustness.
Additionally, we investigate whether the PNIL prohibits neural networks from
obfuscating their gradients during the FGSM-based adversarial training. This
goal was accomplished by training pairs of nearly identical models, the only
difference being that the PNIL is added before one model as an additional first
layer. All models were trained with the NFGSM approach and with the RFGSM
approach [32] for comparison. The robustness of each model was evaluated for
two different adversarial attacks (PGD, SPSA). The effective robustness of a
neural network was then defined as the lowest accuracy against any of the attacks
[31]. Furthermore, to increase the validity of the experiments, we train each
model five times following a two-fold cross-validation scheme as proposed in [5]
and apply the corrected resampled t-test as introduced in [21], to evaluate if
the robustness differences between using the PNIL and not using the PNIL are
significant (α = 0.003). Every data set used in the experiments has a predefined
train and test set, whereby the predefined training sets are used for the cross-
validation. For validating the training, we also split the predefined test data into
two equally sized folds and assign each of them to one cross-validation fold. We
point out that the average accuracy in our experiments may be lower compared to
prior work, as less training data is used to train the models when using the cross-
validation method. In a preliminary experiment, we show that models trained
with the PNIL exhibit lower robustness against adversaries created with the EOT
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method and evaluate how many steps of EOT are needed for reliable evaluation.
The PNIL is released alongside this paper to encourage other researchers to
evaluate our approach independently (https://github.com/SchwinnL/ML).
4.2 Data
Three different data sets were used to evaluate the adversarial robustness of the
different models (MNIST [15], Fashion-MNIST [33], CIFAR10 [11]). All three
data sets consist of images and have the goal of classifying the images according
to their labels.
MNIST consists of greyscale images of handwritten digits each of size 28x28x1
(60,000 training and 10,000 test). The MNIST data set is mainly considered a
toy data set since a trivial classifier such as K-Nearest-Neighbour (KNN) can
achieve 95% accuracy on the clean data set [15]. However, no adversarially ro-
bust neural network architecture has been proposed for the MNIST data set yet.
Thus, MNIST can be considered a non-trivial example in the adversarial case
[25].
Fashion-MNIST consists of greyscale images of 10 different types of cloth-
ing, each of size 28x28x1 (60,000 training and 10,000 test). Similar arguments as
for the MNIST data set can be made for Fashion-MNIST, however the Fashion-
MNIST classification task is slightly more complicated, as it contains more in-
tricate patterns.
CIFAR10 consists of color images, each of size 32x32x3, with 10 different labels
(50,000 training and 10,000 test). CIFAR10 is a subset of the ImageNet data set
[4] and the most challenging classification task out of the three. CIFAR10 is
included in the experiments, to show that the approach generalized also to a
more complicated classification task. Image data from the CIFAR10 data set
was normalized to lie between zero and one.
4.3 Adversarial Attack Parameters
White-box attacks lead to stronger adversarial examples and are, in consequence,
applied in preference to black-box attacks. Since the transferability of black-box
attacks can not be guaranteed, we test the models for gradient obfuscation with
the gradient-free SPSA attack. All attacks are untargeted and are considered
successful if the input is misclassified. We use the often-used l∞ norm to restrict
the magnitude of the adversarial attacks in all experiments. The adversarial
perturbation budget was chosen to be 8/255 for MNIST, 4/255 for Fashion-
MNIST, and 0.03 for CIFAR following prior experiments in the literature [17].
The RFGSM-based training was done with a step size of 1.2 ·  as recommended
by the authors [32]. We used 50 gradient steps for the PGD attack and ensured
that we could reach every point in the -ball with a step size of 2 · /50. We use
100 steps for the SPSA attack with a sample size of 2048 based on the results
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of [31]. We evaluated the SPSA attack on 1000 randomly selected images for
each data set, due to the considerable computational overhead of the attack. All
adversarial attacks were implemented using the Cleverhans library [23] and were
adjusted to work with the EOT method.
4.4 Model and Training Parameters
We trained two different models in our experiments. The first architecture is a
small CNN, consisting of two convolutions followed by a fully-connected layer
suitable for the simpler MNIST and Fashion-MNIST data sets. In addition, a
residual model was used for the more complicated CIFAR10 data set (ResNet11).
Residual models [7], have been used for adversarial benchmarks in prior literature
[17], and hence provide a robust baseline for comparison. A cyclical learning rate
[27] was used together with the ADAM optimizer (β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999) [9] to
speed up the training. The learning rate bounds were estimated by linearly
increasing the learning rate of each individual network for a few epochs, as
suggested in the original paper [27]. All models were optimized till convergence,
and the checkpoint with the lowest adversarial validation loss was chosen for
testing. The batch size was set to 100 for all experiments.
5 Results
The results of the experiments described in Section 4.1 are reported below. First,
a preliminary experiment estimates the effect of the EOT method against the
PNIL. Afterward, the impact of noisy FGSM training and the PNIL on the
adversarial robustness of neural networks is presented.
5.1 Evaluating EOT Parameters
The steps necessary to perform a strong EOT-based attack were estimated on
the CIFAR10 data set against models that have a PNIL as their first layer.
The architectures and hyperparameters were chosen according to section 4.1.
A two-fold cross-validation was performed five times, and the mean accuracy
was reported in Figure 4. Only a marginal decline in robustness against attacks
generated with ten or more Monte Carlo simulations could be observed for all
data sets. Consequently, we conclude that 100 Monte Carlo simulations are more
than sufficient to get a reliable estimate of the real adversarial risk of models,
which include the PNIL.
5.2 Adversarial Robustness
Initial experiments conducted on MNIST, where the PNIL was used not only
before the first layer but also multiple times throughout the network, yielded
comparable results. Since using the PNIL only at the beginning of the neural
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Fig. 4. Mean accuracy of the adversarially trained CIFAR10 models with the PNIL
against PGD adversaries calculated with different amounts of Monte Carlo simulations.
The accuracy is given for NFGSM and RFGSM-based training.
network has the lowest computational complexity. Therefore we only reported
results following this approach.
The evaluation of the adversarial robustness for all configurations is given
in Table 1. Within each training approach (RFGSM-based, NFGSM-based), the
effect of using the PNIL as a first layer is analyzed.
For both approaches, merely training with RFGSM or NFGSM often resulted
in low robustness against gradient-free attacks. Those models exhibit no real ad-
versarial robustness and can be exploited by gradient-free attacks such as SPSA.
Networks, which included the PNIL were not affected by gradient obfuscation,
as seen by their high robustness against the SPSA attack. Furthermore, higher
effective adversarial robustness was achieved in five out of six cases when using
the PNIL, with significant differences in four cases. The two FGSM training pro-
cedures achieved comparable results against the predefined perturbation bound.
To have a better comparison of our approach to results in the prior litera-
ture, an additional experiment was performed on the CIFAR10 data set. In this
experiment, we compared the robustness achieved through PGD training in [17]
(46% accuracy) to our approach and achieved a mean accuracy of 59% over ten
runs. For this experiment, we used the same predefined train-test split of the
CIFAR10 data set. Note that their approach used a weaker PGD attack with 20
instead of 50 steps with the same perturbation budget .
Generalization: A comparison of both methods against the PGD adversary
defined in Section 4.3 with varying perturbation bounds, shows that the NFGSM
method leads to slightly higher robustness against perturbation bounds on which
12 L. Schwinn et al.
Table 1. Mean accuracy and standard deviation (±) in percent for various configura-
tions, with and without the PNIL as the first layer. The perturbation strength was set
to  = 8/255 for MNIST,  = 4/255 for Fashion-MNIST, and  = 0.03 for CIFAR10.
Data from CIFAR10 are normalized between zero and one. The effective adversarial
robustness of a model (lowest accuracy against any of the attacks) is shown with a bold
font in the Min column. Significant differences (α = 0.003) between the effective ro-
bustness with and without the PNIL are highlighted by a star symbol (*). Adversarial
robustness without the PNIL is in some cases achieved through gradient obfuscation
as seen by the low robustness against SPSA attacks.
Data set Model
RFGSM Training NFGSM Training
Clean SPSA PGD Min Clean SPSA PGD Min
CIFAR10
Basline 75±0 58±3 52±0 52*±0 77±1 53±3 50±0 50*±0
+ PNIL 68±0 63±1 57±0 57*±0 66±0 65±2 57±0 57*±0
Fashion-MNIST
Baseline 83±1 2±1 58±9 2*±1 85±0 3±2 64±8 3*±2
+ PNIL 80±0 74±1 70±0 70*±0 82±0 78±1 67±0 67*±0
MNIST
Baseline 98±0 46±28 61±25 46±28 98±0 23±36 54±11 23±36
+ PNIL 98±0 79±1 55±9 55±9 98±0 77±1 60±4 60±4
the classifier was not trained on. The results are given for a baseline model
trained on the CIFAR10 data set in Figure 5.
Working mechanism: Figures 1 and 3 exemplify how the adversarial robust-
ness is improved. Models trained with the PNIL learn weights that lead to small
variances in foreground regions and high variances in background regions. Thus,
the PNIL effectively defends against adversarial attacks that are targeting image
regions, which should be irrelevant for the classification.
6 Discussion
Adversarial training provides a reliable method to make neural networks more
robust against adversarial attacks. Unfortunately, this approach has been limited
by the additional computational effort involved in training with strong adversar-
ial attacks like PGD. We have shown that training with FGSM and additional
input noise can lead to similar robustness. Depending on the step count of the
PGD attack, this can reduce the training time by orders of magnitude. The pro-
posed NFGSM approach led to a small performance improvement against ad-
versarial attacks with varying perturbation budget compared to RFGSM-based
training. Additionally, our method has the benefit that it works with a standard
implementation of the FGSM attack and is, therefore, easier to implement. Still,
both methods can lead to low robustness against gradient-free attacks such as
SPSA. We proposed a solution to this problem by introducing the PNIL and
achieved significantly higher adversarial robustness by using the PNIL as the
first layer of our neural networks. We argue that the additional resampling of
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Fig. 5. Mean accuracy of the adversarially trained CIFAR10 models without the PNIL
against PGD adversaries with varying perturbation bounds. The accuracy is given for
NFGSM and RFGSM-based training. It can be seen that NFGSM-based training leads
to slightly higher robustness for different perturbation strengths, especially for weak
attacks.
the input during training increases the variety of the input and makes the net-
work less likely to obfuscate its gradients. Furthermore, during inference, the
random resampling makes it harder for the attacker to construct an adversarial
sample since the precise outcome of the network is not known in advance.
Contrary to variational autoencoders, no Kullback-Leibler-divergence loss is
used to push the variances computed by the PNIL in a certain direction. Intu-
itively, the PNIL could learn high negative weights and biases for all features,
which would lead to a zero variance in the output. As a result, the PNIL would
not change its inputs during the resampling step, and the network would be
able to minimize the training loss. We argue that most pixels in an image do
not contribute to the classification. Thus, only small gradients are obtained for
the corresponding features in the PNIL, and their values remain relatively un-
changed. The regions where the object of interest is located contribute primarily
to the classification loss and produce larger gradient values. We observe this
behavior in our experiments, as seen in Figures 1 and 3. In return, the network
must focus on the crucial aspects of each image, since background information
is partially lost due to noise generated by the PNIL.
The parameters of the PNIL in Figures 1 and 3 are determined by the fact
that the objects of interest are located in the middle of the image. Consequently,
the learned biases would be rendered ineffective if the relative position of an
object were to change. Nevertheless, in many data sets, such as the ones used
in this paper or the popular ImageNet data set [4], the objects of interest are
most often found in the center of the image. To circumvent depending on the
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position, the variance could be calculated with another neural network. This
way, the context of the pixels could be taken into account.
Our experiments indicate that our approach enables stable FGSM-based ad-
versarial training, and can even outperform PGD-based training. We assume
that the increase in performance and stability will make it easier to deploy
robust neural networks in industrial applications. Furthermore, we hope that
researchers who rely on adversarial training will be able to use the increased
performance and stability of our method to accelerate their research.
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